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Compensating Persons Injured by Medical
Malpractice and Other Tortious Behavior
for Future Medical Expenses Under
the Affordable Care Act
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Jay Angoff PatrickA. Malone,
Charles M. Silver, and Peter H. Weinbergeri*
In an effort to reduce the amount of compensation available to persons
injured by medical malpractice and other torts, opponents of the civil justice
system are proposing that claimants' recovery for future care expenses be
limited to the maximum annual out-of-pocket limit for individuals covered
by health plans under the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")', which in 2015 is
$6,600.2
This proposal should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, it is based
on unreliable assumptions about the ACA. Second, it misunderstands the
scope of the maximum out-of-pocket limit, and because of that it is so impractical that it would be unworkable. Finally, it is bad public policy. Although the originating paper3 frequently highlights the effects of the proposal
on medical malpractice claimants, the proposal and the arguments against it
extend to all those who suffer tort-related injuries.
* Maxwell Mehiman is Distinguished University Professor, Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of
Law, Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
and Professor of Biomedical Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine.
Jay Angoff is a partner with the law firm of Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, in Washington, D.C.,
former Insurance Commissioner for the State of Missouri, and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services from 2010 until 2012, during which time he directed the
office responsible for implementing the private insurance provisions of the Affordable Care
Act. Patrick Malone is a trial lawyer and author at Patrick Malone & Associates, P.C., in
Washington, D.C. and former president of the Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan
Washington, D.C. Charles Silver is the McDonald Chair in Civil Procedure at the University
of Texas School of Law. Peter Weinberger is the managing partner of Spangenberg Shibley
& Liber LLP in Cleveland, Ohio, and past president of the Cuyahoga County Bar Association and the Cleveland Academy of Trial Attorneys. Research funding was provided by the
American Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment.
1. Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Victor Matheson, PotentialEffects of the Affordable Care
Act on the Award of Life Care Expenses, 24 J. FORENSIC ECON. 153, 153 (2013).
2. Out-of-Pocket Maximum/Limit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-limit/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
3.
See Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 153-60.
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Unreliable assumptions: The proposal makes a number of unwarranted
assumptions and errors about the scope and nature of health insurance under
the ACA and the future stability of the law. These include: that the mandated
benefits requirements will remain unchanged and be effectively enforced;4
that the claimant will obtain and be covered by insurance over the entire period that tort-related medical expenses will be incurred;5 and that the medical
care that the claimant will require in the future will be covered by the claimant's health plan at the time that the care is needed and will be available from
the claimant's health care providers.6 None of these assumptions are valid.
Impractical and unworkable: Proponents acknowledge that, in addition
to the maximum annual out-of-pocket limit ("MOOPL"), claimants are entitled to compensation for future medical expenses that their health plan does
not cover.7 But there is no way to predict how much that will be, since there
is no way of knowing which health plans claimants will be enrolled in when
they need the future care, whether the services that they will need will be
covered by those plans, or whether they will incur additional out-of-pocket
costs by having to go outside the plan to obtain the necessary services. These
impracticalities flow from the proponents' apparent misunderstanding of the
nature of the MOOPL, which is a limit only on certain "essential" services
provided by in-network providers in a participant's own plan and is not in
any way an across-the-board guarantee that a participant's health care spending will be capped at the annual limit.8
Bad public policy: The proposal would reduce the deterrent effect of the
tort system, thereby reducing the quality of health care. It would shift costs
from tortfeasors onto taxpayers, and impose further significant losses on innocent persons who sustained negligent injuries. Finally, the proposal would
give critics of the tort system what amounts to sweeping changes that they
failed to obtain through the democratic process.
I. THE PROPOSAL
The proposal to limit compensation for future medicals to the MOOPL
appears to have originated in a paper drafted by two economics professors at
the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts, and was published in 2013 in the Journal of Forensic Economics.9 The authors claim that,
as a result of the "guaranteed issue" provisions in the ACA, "any victim

4.

Id. at 159.

5.

Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

See id. at 153-60.
Id. at 153.
See HEALTHCARE.GOV, supranote 2.
See generally Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 153-60.
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should be able to purchase health insurance" which meets "minimum standards for covered services." 0 Furthermore, because of the "individual mandate" in the ACA, the authors expect virtually everyone to purchase health
insurance under the ACA." Therefore, they claim, since the ACA limits the
annual out-of-pocket costs for medical care "to a maximum of $6,250 plus
the cost of a typical insurance policy in the individual market," 12 that is the
amount that persons injured by negligence should recover from defendants
for their life care costs for medical care. 13
Defendants quickly seized upon the MOOPL proposal as it has been discussed at several national meetings,14 and motions to limit compensation for
future medical expenses to the MOOPL have been filed in federal and state
courts.1 5 So far there have been no reported decisions, but the approach put

forward in the proposal has been rejected in unpublished opinions by the U.S.
District Court in Minnesota16 and the California Court of Appeals.1 7
II. THE PROPOSAL MAKES UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ACA

Supporters of the proposal make a number of unwarranted and erroneous
assumptions about the ACA. They assert that claimants' health plans will
give them access to a comprehensive, well-defined, and detailed set of medical services mandated by federal law, and that the services covered by their
plans will not change over time." The paper states, for example, that "the

10.
11.

Id. at 155.

12.

Id. at 155. [sic] "In 2015, the maximum is $6,600 for an individual and from 2016

Id. at 156-57.

forward, it will be "indexed to the growth in the average health insurance premium." See
HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 2; Richard S. Foster, Estimated FinancialEffects of the "Patient Protection and Affordable CareAct," as Amended, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. 6 (April 22, 2010), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf.
13.
Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1 at 157. The authors of the paper want
to further reduce the patient's recovery by "any pre-injury expected medical costs and penalties if uninsured." Id. at 159. In other words, a person who chooses to pay the penalty under
the ACA for not purchasing insurance would have the penalty deducted from any compensation received for future medical expenses.
14.
Bruce G. Fagel, The Collateral Source Rule Under the Affordable Care Act,
PLAINTIFF 28 (Jan. 2014), http://plaintiffmagazine.com/Janl4/FagelThe-Collateral-SourceRule-under-the-Affordable-Care-ActPlaintiff-article.pdf.
15.
See Seth L. Cardeli, Thwart the Assault on FutureMedical Expenses, 50 TRIAL 14,
19 n.4 (2014) (stating that MOOPL motions have been filed in federal and state courts
throughout the country, including Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Washington).
16.
Halsne v. Health, No. 12-CV-2409 (SRN/JJG), 2014 WL 1153504, at *28-31 (D.
Minn. Mar. 21, 2014).
17.
Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., No. B204908, 2013 WL 221654, at *5, 7, 11-12 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. Jan. 22, 2013).
18.
Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 155, 157.
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ACA sets minimum standards for covered services" 19 and that, in determining compensation for claimants beyond the MOOPL, life care planners, experts who estimate claimants' future health care needs, can consider which
services "would normally be covered by the minimum insurance requirements mandated by the ACA ...

"20

As the following sections demonstrate,

however, these assumptions are unsound because the ACA does not create a
clearly-defined package of health care services that all health plans are required to provide.2 1
A.

Shifting Standardsfor What Must Be Covered

The truth is that the essential benefits that the ACA requires health plans
to cover are extremely vague and unstable.22 The ACA describes them only
in very general terms (such as "hospitalization" and "pediatric services"),23
and leaves it up to the states to fill in the details.24 Claimants may switch
19.
Id. at 155.
20. Id. at 157; see also Mark S. Yagerman & Max Bookman, How Obamacare May Limit
Projected Expenses in Personal Injury Life Care Plans (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/YagermanBookan.HowObamacareMayLimitProjectedExpensesInPersonallnjuryLifeCarePlans.pdf ("Under the ACA, all plans will be required to meet a certain minimum coverage standard. Therefore, while it is true that there will
be future variations above and beyond that minimum standard, it is also true that notwithstanding any such variation, all plans policies will maintain a certain required baseline. As such, at
the very least, defendants will argue that the jury should be permitted to consider an attack on
a life care plan that fails to take into account the fact that no matter what health care coverage
a plaintiff may obtain in the future, any such coverage must meet the ACA's minimum requirements.").
21.
Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: 'inimum Value'PlansMust Have Hospital and Physician Coverage, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://

healthaffairs.org/blog.
22.
Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care
Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 441, 448 (2014) (stating that the states

have "no additional guidance or regulations on essential health benefits" leaving leaders to
make decisions based on "vague guidance and guesswork").
23.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (2015) ("[The ACA states: ..
T]he Secretary shall define
the essential health benefits, except that such benefits shall include at least the following general categories and the items and services covered within the categories: (A) Ambulatory patient services. (B) Emergency services. (C) Hospitalization. (D) Maternity and newborn care.
(E) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.
(F) Prescription drugs. (G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. (H) Laboratory
services. (I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management. (J) Pediatric
services, including oral and vision care.").
24.
See Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief EssentialHealth Benefits, HEALTH AFF. 1
(May 2, 2013), availableat http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/briefpdfs/
healthpolicybrief 91.pdf ("[R]ather than establishing a national standard for these benefits,
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) decided to allow each state to choose
from a set of plans to serve as the benchmark plan in their state. Whatever benefits that plan
covers in the 10 categories will be deemed the essential benefits for plans in the state."). A
number of Democratic lawmakers, consumer groups, and providers have criticized this approach on the ground that the benefits could be inadequate. Id. at 3.
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plans, each having its own coverage policies, or they might move to different
states with different coverage requirements. Moreover, the essential benefits
requirements do not apply to self-insured plans, employer plans in the largegroup market, or plans that already existed when the ACA was enacted.2 5 In
addition, the administration has indicated that after 2015, it may alter how
the states decide what services must be covered.2 6
Individual health insurance plans continue to have wide leeway in deciding which services they will cover at any point in time.27 Since plans are written for one-year periods, each insurer is free to change the benefits offered,
as long as the plan remains ACA-compliant, and consumers have a contractual right to enforce a particular benefits package only for the current year.2 8
Under the ACA, plans must provide benefits that have an average cost for
covered benefits, known as "actuarial value," equivalent to the "benchmark
plan" within each of the essential benefits categories, but they do not have to
replicate the specific benefits offered by the benchmark plan. 29 An example
of the scope of plan discretion can be seen in the category of rehabilitative
services and habilitative services and devices: since the two types of services
(one focused on restoring skills and functions and the other on creating them)
are listed in the same benefit category, unless prohibited by the state, plans
can provide different mixes of the two services and can change the mix at
any annual open enrollment period.30 Furthermore, plans continue to be al-

25.

Id. at 2 (defining large-group market as "generally companies with more than 100

employees").
26.
Id.
27.
Jennifer McCarthy, The Complete Guide to Health Insurance, THE SIMPLE DOLLAR,
http://www.thesimpledollar.com/health-insurance-guide/ (last updated May 1, 2015) (refer-

encing a comparison image that illustrates that 68% of Minnesota's health insurance plans do
not cover labor and delivery, 60% do not cover mental health services, and 28% do not cover

specialty drugs and only 45% of Massachusetts's plans cover hospitalization, hospital-based
physician care and imaging); Cassidy, supra note 24, at 1 ("HHS estimates that 62% of plans
in the individual market do not provide maternity coverage, 18% do not cover mental health

services, and 9% do not cover the cost of prescription drugs").
28.
See Plan Year, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/plan-year/,
(last visited November 16, 2015).
29.
See Cassidy, supra note 24, at 2 ("The federal regulations do not require insurers to

replicate the benefits in the benchmark plan; rather, the benefits offered must be 'actuarially
equivalent' to those in the benchmark plan, meaning that the benefits are of approximately the
same value in each of the ten required categories."); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(4) (2015)
(defining the required benefits package within each category and stating that the Secretary of
HHS must not unduly weight benefits toward any category, discriminate on the basis of age,
disability, or life expectancy, or fail to take into account the health care needs of diverse segments of the population).
30.
See Sara J. Rosenbaum, Habilitative Services Coveragefor Children Under the Essential Benefit Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, HEALTH POL'Y ISSUE BRIEFS, (May

2013), at 9 ("Since rehabilitative and habilitative services fall within the same benefit class,
this presumably means that in selecting between the two habilitative services coverage options
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lowed to decide whether or not a certain type of care is "medically necessary," and therefore will or will not be covered.31 In short, as one commentator observed, "[t]here is no degree of certainty regarding the exact coverage
a plaintiff will receive in the future or whether the law's requirements will
stand the tests of time." 32
B.

The Problem of Out-of-Network Care and "BalanceBilling"

In assuming that claimants will have access to a statutorily mandated set
of benefits, the proposal also appears to suppose that claimants will be able
to obtain all the medical care they need from providers who are within their
plan networks. 33 However, one way that health plans control costs is by limiting the number of physicians, hospitals, laboratories, and other health care
providers in their networks. 34 This is becoming a reality as reports surface
stating that plans are currently creating narrow networks with smaller numbers of hospitals, physicians, and other providers. 35 As a result of the narrowing, this could mean that even if a claimant's providers are in the plan network at one point, they may no longer be in the plan in the future when the
claimant needs their services.
If claimants cannot obtain the care they require within their health plan
network, they will have to obtain care from out-of-plan providers or forgo
the care if they cannot afford it. 36 Patients who obtain care from out-of-network providers often must pay more out-of-pocket than for care from network providers, since providers who are not in the plan network may be free
to bill patients whatever they wish for the entire costs of care or for that portion of their charges that is not paid by the plan-this practice is known as

under the rule (i.e., parity versus insurer-defined level of coverage), insurers may offer a lesser

scope of habilitative coverage in favor of a richer rehabilitative benefit package.").
31.
See, e.g., David M. Studdert & Carole R. Gresenz, Enrollee Appeals of Preservice
Coverage Denials at Two Health Maintenance Organizations, 289 JAMA 864, 864 (2003)
(reporting that almost thirty-seven percent of appeals of denials of coverage by HMOs involved medical necessity disputes).
32.
Cardeli, supra note 15, at 18-19.
33.
See generally Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 153-60.
34. See Dianne McCarthy, NarrowingProvider Choice:Any Willing ProviderLaws After
New York Blue Cross v. Travelers, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 98 (1997).
35.
See Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES, May

12, 2014, at Al ("No matter what kind of health plan consumers choose, they will find fewer
doctors and hospitals in their network-or pay much more for the privilege of going to any
provider they want.").
36.
Jim Burress, Some Insured PatientsStill Skip Care Because of High Costs, KAISER
HEALTH NEWs (June 10, 2015), http://khn.org/news/some-insured-patients-still-skip-carebecause-of-high-costs// (according to Lydia Mitts, a senior policy analyst with the health care

advocacy group, Families USA, "One in four adults who were fully insured for the whole year
still reported they went without some needed medical care because they couldn't afford it.").
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balance billing.37 In fact, since the ACA only requires plans to pay for emergency services and certain types of preventive care that enrollees receive
from out-of-network providers, claimants may have to pay the entire cost of
out-of-network care themselves.38 Moreover, more and more out-of-network
physicians and hospitals are unwilling to accept any insurance payments
whatsoever, requiring patients to pay the entire bill out-of-pocket and seek,
on their own, whatever reimbursement they can get from their insurer.39 The
problem is worsened if patients are unaware that their care is being provided
out-of-network until enormous bills start coming in, and even if made aware,
may be unable to be treated by all in-network providers, especially in a complex hospital stay with multiple providers.40
The ACA requires HHS to impose network adequacy standards for plans
that are sold on health exchanges.4 1 The plans must "ensure a sufficient
choice of providers," include "essential community providers" who serve
low-income, medically-underserved populations,42 and "maintain[] a network that is sufficient in number and types of providers, including providers
that specialize in mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that
all services will be accessible without unreasonable delay . . . ."4 As in the
case of the essential benefits package, however, the ACA delegates the responsibility for establishing specific adequacy standards and making sure

37.
JACK HOADLEY ET AL., BALANCE BILLING: How ARE STATES PROTECTING CONSUMERS
FROM UNEXPECTED CHARGES?, CENTER ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS 3 (June 2015), availableat
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue-briefs/2015/rwjf420966

(defining what

a balance bill is in the article's introduction).
38.

See State Restriction Against Providers Balance Billing Managed Care Enrollees,

KAISER FAM. FOUND. (March 2013), http://kff.org/private-insurance/state-indicator/state-re-

striction-against-providers-balance-billing-managed-care-enrollees/

(last

updated

March

2013) ("The Affordable Care Act provides some protections for enrollees in need of emergency services, but does not prohibit balance billing by out-of-network providers.").
39.
See, e.g., Jen Christensen, Obamacare: Fewer Options For Many, CNN (Oct. 29,
2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/health/obamacare-doctors-limited/ (according to CNN, for example, as of 2013, a hospital in Concord, New Hampshire, would not accept

any insurance policies from any health plans from the state's marketplace, and similar limits
are being imposed by medical centers at New York University, UCLA, and Emory); see also
Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of PhysiciansSaid They Would Not Accept New
Medicaid Patients, But Rising Fees May Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1679 (2012) (citing a
2011 study that found "Thirty-one percent of physicians were unwilling to accept any new
Medicaid patients;; 17% would not accept new Medicare patients; and 18% of physicians

would not accept new privately insured patients.").
40.

N.Y.

See Tara S. Bernard, Out of Network, Not by Choice, and Facing Huge Health Bills,
TIMES,

Oct. 19, 2013, at BI (describing a patient's experience receiving care from out-

of-network doctors working in an in-network hospital, notfor the hospital, and being charged
higher rates as a result).
41.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1) (2010).
42.
Id.
43.
Network Adequacy Standards, 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2015).
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that they are met to the states, which have adopted different types of standards, have limited enforcement powers," and vary significantly in their efforts to wield the enforcement powers that they possess. 45 Therefore, malpractice and other tort claimants cannot assume that the networks provided
by their health plans will be adequate to meet their future tort-related health
care needs, or that the networks will remain adequate over time.
C.

Uninsuredand UninsurableAmericans

A further basic assumption underlying the proposal is that, thanks to the
individual mandate and guaranteed issue provisions in the ACA, claimants
will have health insurance. 46 But many people are exempt, practically or legally, from the mandate: "members of certain religious groups and Native
American tribes; undocumented immigrants (who are not eligible for health
insurance subsidies under the law); incarcerated individuals; people whose
incomes are so low they don't have to file taxes ... ; and people for whom
health insurance is considered unaffordable (where insurance premiums after
employer contributions and federal subsidies exceed 8% of family income)."47 According to an estimate by Jonathan Gruber at MIT, forty percent
of those who would lack insurance in the absence of the ACA are exempt
under the law.4 8
Other individuals will not have insurance because they choose to pay the
tax. 49 In 2015, the tax is $325 per person or 2 percent of yearly income; from

2016 on, the tax is $695 per person or 2.5 percent of yearly income. 0 Even

44.
See, e.g., Paul Shukovsky, Washington Insurance Commissioner Adopts New Provider Network Rules, 23 HEALTH L. REP. 660, 660 (2014) (quoting a spokesperson for Washington State Insurance Commissioner as stating "we don't believe we have the authority to

force an insurance company to contract with a provider").
45.
See Sally McCarthy & Max Ferris, ACA Implicationsfor State Network Adequacy
Standards, ST. HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK 12-16 (Aug. 2013), http://
www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issuebriefsbriefs/2013/rwjf407486rwjf407486
(summarizing the approach taken by various states to different network adequacy standards).
46.
Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 156 (stating that due to the individual
mandate and the subsidies under the ACA, one should expect most persons to have to have
insurance).
47.
Cynthia Cox & Larry Levitt, The IndividualMandate: How Sweeping?, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (March 21, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/the-individual-mandatehow-sweeping/.
48.
Id.
49.
See Health Care Coverage and Federal Income Taxes, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/health-coverageand-federal-income-taxes/index.htnl (last visited on Feb 18, 2015) (stating that "A much
smaller fraction of taxpayers, an estimated 2 to 4 percent, will pay a fee because they made a
choice to not obtain coverage they could have afforded and are not eligible for an exemption.").
50.
See The Fee You Pay If You Don't Have Health Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-if-i-dont-have-health-coverage/ (last visited May 14, 2014).
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after 2016, the tax is much cheaper than the cost for the least expensive
bronze health insurance plan; in the state with the lowest premiums for health
plans on its federal exchange in 2013, Minnesota, the premium for the least
expensive bronze plan was approximately $1,320 a year. 1 Moreover, people
who are not owed a federal income tax refund may decide to neither purchase
insurance nor pay the tax, since the only recourse for the government if someone does not pay the individual mandate is to deduct it from their tax refund.52
One reason that proponents assume that all claimants will have health insurance is that those who do not have insurance when they are injured will
purchase it because they have a duty to mitigate their damages. 53 If claimants
failed to mitigate their damages by purchasing insurance, the reasoning
seems to go, they would not be entitled to compensation from tortfeasors for
the costs of future care that insurance would have covered. 54 This view is
fundamentally incorrect because it confuses loss-mitigation with loss-transfer. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "one injured by the tort
of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have
avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission
of the tort."55 The purchase of health insurance does not "avoid harm"; the
MOOPL proposal merely transfers the losses caused by the harm from the
tortfeasor to the claimant's health insurer. Claimants therefore are not required to purchase health insurance in order to mitigate their damages.

51.
See Commerce DepartmentReleases Rate Analysis - Minnesota Retains the Number
One Rates in the Country, MINN. DEP'T OF COM. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://mn.gov/commerce/
insurance/media/newsdetailj sp?id=209-86346.
52.

See ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41331, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNDER

THE ACA 3 (2015).
53.
See Joseph A. H. McGovern & John D. Morio, Affordable Care Act Has Potentialto
Limit a Defendant'sExposure for FutureMedical Costs in New York PersonalInjury Litigation, MARTINDALE.COM (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.martindale.com/personal-injury-law/
articleWilson-Elser-Moskowitz-Edelman-Dicker 2060248.htm (applying the duty-to-miti-

gate-damages rule, "because insurance is now available to everyone, regardless of any preexisting medical conditions, sound public policy would require an injured plaintiff to purchase
insurance to pay for his future medical care"); see also Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra

note 1, at 156 ("If the individual was uninsured prior to the accident, the additional out-ofpocket costs for medical care for any victim of an accident is a maximum of $6,250 plus the
cost of a typical health insurance policy in the individual market less any government subsidies
for the policy, the government imposed fine for not purchasing health insurance, and the med-

ical care costs the individual would have expected absent the accident."). Prior to the ACA,
the argument goes, uninsured claimants would not have been able to purchase health insurance
to cover the medical costs associated with their malpractice injury because the injury would
have been considered a pre-existing condition, but they can buy insurance now because of the

guaranteed-issue requirements of the law.
54.
See McGovern & Morio, supra note 54.
55.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §918(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
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The Unknowable Future of Health Insurance

A final assumption made by supporters of the proposal is that the law will
remain in effect over the lifetime of the person seeking compensation for future medical expenses.s" The authors themselves admit, however, that the
ACA is still open to repeal by the federal government.5 ' As stated by
Congdon-Hohman and Matheson, "[i]n fact, the Republican Party has made
the repeal of the ACA a primary plank of their election campaigns in both
2010 and 2012 (Sack 2010 and Cooper 2012)."ss
Even if the ACA is not repealed in whole or in part, the effective dates of
the requirements that are key to the proposal may be postponed, or their enforcement may be delayed. 59 In August 2013, for example, the maximum outof-pocket cost limit was delayed for some insurers until 2015.60 Similar delays have been announced for restrictions on retaining preexisting health
plans and for the so-called employer mandate.61 Furthermore, HHS has made
it clear that it does not view enforcement as a high priority, as evidenced from
the following statement on its website:
Our approach to implementation is and will continue to be marked by an
emphasis on assisting (rather than imposing penalties on) plans, issuers and
others that are working diligently and in good faith to understand and come
into compliance with the new law. This approach includes, where appropriate, transition provisions, grace periods, safe harbors, and other policies to
ensure that the new provisions take effect smoothly, minimizing any disruption to existing plans and practices.62
56.
57.

See Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 159.
See Cardeli, supra note 15, at 19 ("As long as the law is subject to repeal or modifi-

cation, there is no reasonable certainty that an individual will be subject to the ACA's mandate
for the rest of his or her life.").
58.
Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 159 ("Though Republican candidates vary on which specific parts of the law they would vote to repeal, the individual mandate
is the clearest target. Without the mandate, the guaranteed issue requirement of the ACA which
is what would allow plaintiffs to be able to purchase affordable insurance, would not be eco-

nomically feasible for health insurers."). Some think that the prospects for repealing the ACA
are looking brighter with predictions that the Republicans may win control of both houses of
Congress in 2014.
59.
See Robert Pear, A Limit on Consumer Costs Is Delayed in Health Care Law, N.Y.
TIMIEs, Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/a-limit-on-consumer-costs-isdelayed-in-health-care-law.html?pagewanted=all (giving examples of various key components to ACA that have been delayed thus far).
60.
See id.
61.
See Nicholas Bagley, The Legality ofDelaying Key Elements oftheACA, 370 N. ENG.
J. MED. 1967, 1967-68 (2014); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Simon Lazarus, Obama's
ACA Delays - Breaking the Law or Making It Work?, 370 N. ENG. J. MED. 1970, 1970 (2014).
62.
The Centerfor Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, Affordable Care Act
Implementation FAQs-Set 1, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/acaimplementation-faqs.html
(last visited May
14, 2014).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss1/4

10

Mehlman et al.: Compensating Persons Injured by Medical Malpractice and Other Tor

2016

Compensating Persons Injured by Medical Malpractice

45

Finally, some individuals may desire health insurance but have difficulty
purchasing it.63 The challenges they face could extend far beyond the wellpublicized problems with online registration, such as long online waits, inability to open accounts, duplicate enrollments and other data errors, and missing information on the government website.64 Although the ACA contains
mechanisms that supposedly remove the incentive for health insurers to favor
individuals who are healthier over sicker enrollees and therefore would be
the most profitable, 5 insurers still have reasons to be selective in whom they
enroll. For example, actuarial consultants have determined that the risk adjustment method used by the ACA pays health plans more for patients with
certain conditions than patients with other conditions.66 Health plans therefore can be expected to discourage certain types of patients from enrolling
using cherry-picking techniques similar to those that they employed prior to
the enactment of the ACA, such as how they structure their benefits packages
and market their policies.6 ' Nothing in the ACA forbids this insurer behavior.68

63.
See Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/
(stating that

",many uninsured people cite the high cost of insurance as the main reason they lack coverage").
64.
See Robert Pear et al., From the Start, Signs of Trouble at HealthPortal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/201 3/10/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-oftrouble-at-health-portal.html (reporting on the problems with enrollment on the health insurance marketplace when the website first opened); see also Amy Goldstein, HealthCare.gov
Can't Handle Appeals ofEnrollmentErrors,WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/healthcaregov-cant-handle-appeals-ofenrollment-errors/2014/02/02/bbf5280c-89e2-11e3-916e-e01534blel32_story.html (reporting some of the issuing impacting individuals who tried to enroll in health plans through the
health insurance marketplace during the first few months).
65.
See ExplainingHealth Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaininghealth-care-reform-risk-adjustment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors/ (discussing in length the

three risk programs (the "3R's"), which includes: risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors).
66.
See Jason Siegel & Jason Petroske, When Adverse Selection Isn't: Which Members
Are Likely to Be Profitable (orNot) in Markets Regulated By the ACA, MLLIMAN 2-3 (Dec.
2013) (The ACA risk-adjustment method, which is based on the method that CMS uses to
risk-adjust premiums for Medicare Advantage Plans, only adjusts for certain conditions-

those that are listed in CMS' Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCCs). Many conditions are
not listed, and therefore, do not result in increased payments to the health plan after adjustments for risk. Risk-adjustment works by requiring all plans pay into a fund and making proportionately larger payouts from the fund to plans that enroll less healthy individuals. Plans
that enroll more persons with HCC conditions will receive more from the fund than plans that
enroll fewer persons with HCC conditions).
67.
Adverse Selection Issues and HealthInsurance Exchanges Under the Affordable Care
Act, NAT'L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM'N. 3 (2011), http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-OP.pdf.
68.
See id. at 3-5 (listing the key ACA provisions that address adverse selection).
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III. THE PROPOSAL IS UNWORKABLE

The proposal not only makes unwarranted assumptions about the ACA but
it is unworkable in practice. Proponents of the compensation limit
acknowledge that claimants would be entitled not only to the MOOPL, but
to any out-of-pocket expenses for care that their insurance did not pay for.69
Yet there are likely to be many uncovered services,70 and as discussed in the
previous section, it will be impossible to predict what care claimants' health
plans will cover in the future.
A.

UnpredictableOut-of-Pocket Expenses for Out-of-Network Care

A major factor that confounds an attempt to calculate claimants' out-ofpocket costs for future medical care is that the services that claimants will
need may not be available from a provider within their health plan network
or from one who accepts payments from the claimant's plan. Claimants may
end up paying substantial sums out-of-pocket to obtain the care they need,
and since the MOOPL only applies to the costs of care obtained within their
health plan network,72 there is no limit on how much claimants may have to
pay to obtain care out of their network. In addition, the MOOPL does not
include amounts that claimants in certain large group or self-insured plans
who obtain out-of-network care may be required to pay out-of-pocket as a
result of the practice known as "reference pricing," which makes plan members pay the difference between the price set by the plan for the service in
question and what the out-of-plan provider charges.73 Under the MOOPL
69.
See Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 157 ("The life care planner also
needs to specifically address which health care and living expenses would normally be covered
by the minimum insurance requirements mandated by the ACA and which health expenditures
would result in out-of-pocket costs to the plaintiff necessitating their inclusion in a damage

award.").
70.

See Yagerman & Bookman, supra note 20 ("Expenses such as long term care, nursing

care, and homecare, which are known in the insurance industry as 'permanent confinement
issues,' are hardly ever covered by health insurance. Those expenses are often extremely
pricey, and are paid either out-of-pocket, or by short and long term disability insurance, if the
individual has obtained such insurance.").
71.
See Studdert & Gresenze, supra note 32, at 866 (one in five appeals of plan denials
of coverage involved access to out-of-network services).
72.
See HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 2 ("This limit does not have to count premiums,
balance billing amounts for non-network providers and other out-of-network cost-sharing, or
spending for non-essential health benefits.").
73.

See U.S. Dep't of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Implementation (PartXIX),

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (May 2, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-acal9.htnl ("Until
guidance is issued and effective, with respect to a large group market plan or self-insured
group health plan that utilizes a reference-based pricing program, the Departments will not
consider a plan or issuer as failing to comply with the out-of-pocket maximum requirements
of PHS Act section 2707(b) because it treats providers that accept the reference amount as the
only in-network providers, provided the plan uses a reasonable method to ensure that it provides adequate access to quality providers.").
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proposal, claimants in theory are entitled to recover all of these out-of-pocket
costs, but as noted in the previous section, it is impossible to predict what
they will be. There is no way to determine in advance what services will be
available within which plan networks, or how much claimants will have to
pay out-of-pocket to obtain care outside the network.
B.

UnpredictableCoveragefor Future Care

Another reason the proposal is unworkable is that, as noted earlier, it is
impossible to predict what health care claimants' plans will cover. During the
time they will require care for tort-related injuries, claimants' circumstances
are likely to change, resulting in changes in their health coverage.74 People
can be expected to purchase different amounts of coverage, for example, depending on whether they are young and healthy, marry, divorce, become
pregnant, have children, age, or become ill or develop chronic medical conditions. 5 In addition, claimants may switch plans when they or a partner
changes jobs or upon the death of a partner under whose plan they were insured.7 6' Each plan will cover different services, and plans can alter what they
cover over time.7 7 Moreover, even if the care that a claimant needs is a mandatory benefit in one state, the claimant may move to a different state with
different coverage requirements.78 Since there is no way to know what coverage claimants will have under different plans, this makes predicting their
out-of-pocket costs even more difficult.
Regardless of state benefit requirements, individual plans have broad discretion to limit what they cover: for example, limiting the annual number of
patient visits to certain types of providers. 79 In addition, as noted earlier, the
74.
Peter J. Cunningham & Linda Kohn, Health Plan Switching: Choice or Circumstance?, 19 HEALTH AFF. 158, 159 (2000) (discussing the most common reasons people
change their health coverage).

75.

Id. at 159-60.

76.
Id. at 160.
77.
See What Marketplace Plans Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015) (explaining that even

within the same state, there can be differences in the health plans' covered services and procedures).

78. Id. (explaining that "some states require insurers to cover additional services and procedures.").
79.

See Frequently Asked Questions on Essential Health Benefits Bulletin CTRS. FOR
(Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/

MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.

files/downloads/ehb-faq-508.pdf ("Under the approach described in the Bulletin, a plan could
substitute coverage of services within each of the ten statutory categories, so long as substitutions were actuarially equivalent, based on standards set forth in CHIP regulations at 42 CFR
457.43 1, and provided that substitutions would not violate other statutory provisions. For example, a plan could offer coverage consistent with a benchmark plan offering up to 20 covered
physical therapy visits and 10 covered occupational therapy visits by replacing them with up
to 10 covered physical therapy visits and up to 20 covered occupational therapy visits, assuming actuarial equivalence and the other criteria are met. Q: Can scope and duration limits be
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fact that a plan covers a certain service does not guarantee that it will pay for
it, since benefits administrators have broad discretion to determine whether
care is "medically necessary" in specific instances. 0 Finally, plans may
change the way they interpret and apply their coverage policies." In short,
there is no way to predict whether claimants will be insured for the future
care that they will require.
These considerations recently led a California court in an unpublished
opinion to reject a hospital defendants' argument that compensation for future medical expenses should be reduced because the malpractice claimant
was currently insured:
The mere possibility that private insurance coverage will continue, and the
availability of government programs for the purchase of insurance, do not,
in themselves, constitute relevant, admissible evidence of the future insurance benefits that a plaintiff is reasonably certain to receive. To show the
amount of future insurance coverage that is reasonably certain, the evidence would have to: (1) link particular coverage and coverage amounts to
particular items of care and treatment in the life care plan, (2) present a
reasonable basis on which to believe that this particular plaintiff is reasonably certain to have that coverage, and (3) provide a basis on which to
calculate with reasonable certainty the time period such coverage will exist. The Hospital made no such foundational showing in the trial court, and
on appeal appears to assume that even the most nonspecific evidence of
future insurance, such as its availability through governmental programs,
is admissible. Such evidence, standing alone, is irrelevant to prove reasonably certain insurance coverage as a potential offset against future damages, because it has no tendency in reason to prove that specific items of
future care and treatment will be covered, the amount of that coverage, or
the duration of that coverage. 82
Proponents of the MOOPL approach, such as Mark Yagerman and Max
Bookman, in fact have conceded the unpredictability of future insurance coverage:

included in the EHB [Essential Health Benefits]? A: Yes."); see also Yagerman & Bookman,
supra note 20 (" [O]ther expenses, such as continuous physical therapy and occupational therapy, are often capped by most health insurance plans at a certain number of visits. These are
known as 'frequency issues' by insurers. Life care plans often project extensive numbers of
such visits, which often go beyond the frequency cap of even the highest quality health insurance policies. Therefore, to the extent that a plaintiff's health insurance contains a frequency
cap, those non-covered expenses projected by the life plan will remain out-of-pocket.").
80. See Michael Bihari, Medical Necessity, ABOUT HEALTH, http://healthinsurance.about.com/od/healthinsurancetermsm/g/medical-necessity-definition.htm (last updated
Dec. 15, 2014).
81. See McCarthy, supranote 27.
82. Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., No. B204908, 2013 WL 221654, at *12 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. Jan. 22, 2013).
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A potent argument against allowing direct presentation of future health insurance coverage to the jury is that although the ACA's individual mandate
will result in near-universal coverage, it does not account for the innumerable variations in coverage levels that are available. As an individual goes
through life, he or she will likely go through several different insurance
policies, all with various levels of coverage. The argument goes that it is
impossible to predict what level of coverage an individual will have at any
given point in the future, and that the ACA merely assures that the individual will have some coverage. Therefore, it is claimed that life care plans
should remain free from attack in front of the jury on account of failure to
factor in future health insurance. 83

Yagerman and Bookman's only rejoinder is that health plans will have to
meet the benefits requirements of the ACA. 84 As discussed in the previous
section, however, the ACA's minimum requirements are insufficient to pre-

dict what future services a claimant's plan will cover.
C.

Byzantine Billing Practices

Another consideration that will prevent calculating the amounts that
claimants are due from tortfeasors for their non-insured out-of-pocket future

care is the difference between the "list price" or what providers bill to "selfpay" patients, and what in fact they are paid by insurers. 5 Insurers negotiate
varying discounts, and they typically depend on the market power of the provider versus that of the insurer.8 6 States such as Texas, Missouri, California,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Ohio are, either through statute or
state court decisions, increasingly attempting to limit awards for past medical
expenses-those incurred between the injury and the trial-to the amounts
actually paid.87 In 2011, the Texas Supreme Court went so far as to specifi-

83. Yagerman & Bookman, supra note 20.
84. Id. ("Under the ACA, all plans will be required to meet a certain minimum coverage
standard. Therefore, while it is true that there will be future variations above and beyond that
minimum standard, it is also true that notwithstanding any such variation, all plans policies
will maintain a certain required baseline. As such, at the very least, defendants will argue that
the jury should be permitted to consider an attack on a life care plan that fails to take into
account the fact that no matter what health care coverage a plaintiff may obtain in the future,
any such coverage must meet the ACA's minimum requirements.").
85.
See Hospitals Generally Charge Self-pay PatientsTop Pricefor Care, but Some Providers Now Offer Deep Discountsfor Patients Who Pay with Cash, DARK DAILY (July 26,

2013), http://www.darkdaily.com/hospitals-generally-charge-self-pay-patients-top-price-forcare-but-some-providers-now-offer-deep-discounts-for-patients-who-pay-with-cash726#axzz3rfo9wduQ.
86.
See Alan T. Sorensen, Insurer-HospitalBargaining:Negotiated Discounts in PostRegulation Connecticut, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 469,471-72 (2003).
87.
See, e.g., Benjamin A. Geslison & Kevin T. Jacobs, The CollateralSource Rule and
Medical Expenses: AnticipatedEffects of the Affordable CareAct and Recent State Case Law
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cally suggest that the same approach should, in addition to past medical expenses, also be applied to future medical expenses.
The difference between the list price and what insurers actually pay to
providers can be substantial.89 One study found that insurers in 2004 paid
hospitals only approximately 38 percent of their list price.90 Furthermore,
determining what insurers actually pay is extremely convoluted.91 Health
care economist Uwe Reinhardt called the process "chaos behind a veil of secrecy," noting that the "actual dollar payments have traditionally been kept
as strict, proprietary trade secrets by both the hospitals and the insurers."92
Other authors explain that:
When it comes time to bill and pay, the parties execute a complex kabuki
dance where the provider submits a bill for the full list price of the services
performed, whereupon the insurer applies the discount to arrive at the prenegotiated rate, and then pays to the provider a percentage of that rate specified by the health plan to which the patient is subscribed. This leaves the
patient to pay the remainder as a 'coinsurance' payment. 93
Now imagine the difficulty in trying to calculate the difference between
list price and amounts paid by an insurer forfuture medical expenses. As one
pair of authors observe,
In addition to predicting the probable future treatment that a plaintiff might
require, expert testimony may be needed to properly estimate, not just what
the list price of that treatment is, but what amount actually would be paid,
based on the historic contract terms between the plaintiff's insurer and the
on Damages in Personal Injury Lawsuits, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 239, 248 (2013); Robinson v.

Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the defendant may introduce evidence
of amounts "written-off' of medical bills since those amounts are never paid by any collateral
source) (emphasis in original); contra Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 446 (W. Va. 2014)
(holding that ". . the collateral source rule permits an injured person to recover all of his or
her reasonable medical costs that were necessarily required by the injury. Where a person's
health care provider agrees to reduce, discount or write off a portion of the person's medical
bill, the collateral source rule permits the person to recover the entire reasonable value of the
medical services necessarily required by the injury. The tortfeasor is not entitled to receive the
benefit of the reduced, discounted or written-off amount.") (emphasis in original).
88. See, e.g., Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 396-97 (Tex. 2011); Geslison
& Jacobs, supranote 87 at 249 (noting that "[sleveral times in the Haygood opinion, the court
used language like 'have been or will be paid,' 'have been or must be paid,' and 'paid or to be
paid' to interpret Section 41.0105's 'actually paid and incurred' language.") (emphasis in original).
89.
See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil
of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 57 (2006).

90.
See id.
91.
See id. (quoting a leading expert on how hospitals price services, who stated "there is
no method to this madness").
92.
Id. at 62.
93.
Geslison & Jacobs, supra note 87, at 243.
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healthcare provider. Additional unknowns must also be addressed, such
as whether the plaintiff is expected to maintain his current health insurance,
or what the future costs of the needed procedures are anticipated to be. 94
D.

Secondary-PayerStatus of Public Insurance Programs

A further complication to the task of calculating claimants' future out-ofpocket expenses is that Medicare and Medicaid are entitled to recover their
future medical payments from claimants' tort recoveries.95 Medicare and
Medicaid by statute are secondary payers. 96 Secondary payers are only required to pay for care that is not paid for by other sources. 97 Furthermore,
secondary payers have a statutory right to be reimbursed by individuals they
covered who also received funds from other sources to pay for future care. 98
In 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) stated that
Medicare intended to assert its right to reimbursement for future medical expenses in liability cases. 99 In 2012, CMS issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking input on how Medicare should ensure
that it received the payments that it was due. 0 0 Since then, the Office of Management and Budget has withdrawn the proposed regulation. 10 However,
94.

Id.

95.
See Medicare Secondary Payer and "Future Medicals" 77 Fed. Reg. 35917, 35919
(June 15, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 411); Salvatore G. Rotella, Jr., Solving
the Medicaid Secondary Payment Puzzle, COMPLIANCE TODAY 32, 32-33 (August 2012),
http://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/ComplianceToday/0812/CT_0812

Rotella.pdf
96.
See Medicare Secondary Payer, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-ofBenefits-and-Recovery-Overview/Medicare-Secondary-Payer/Medicare-SecondaryPayer.html (last updated January 30, 2014).
97.
See Medicare Secondary Payerfor Providers, Physicians, Other Suppliers, and Billing Staff, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 1 (Feb. 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-

and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/
MSPFactSheet.pdf.
98.
See Fagel, supra note 14, at 3 (stating a claimant on Medicare, for example, may be
required to establish a "Medicare Set-Aside Trust" from which Medicare can seek reimbursement for its future expenditures on behalf of the claimant. In the case of a Medicaid claimant,
compensation for future medical expenses from a settlement or jury award is placed in a Special Needs Trust so that the claimant can continue to qualify for Medicaid despite the recovery,
and if funds remain in the trust at time of the claimant's death, Medicaid is entitled to obtain
reimbursement (via a lien) for medical expenses that it paid.); see also John J. Campbell, Preserving Public Benefits in Physical Injury Settlements: Special-Needs Trusts and Beyond, 2

NAELA J. 367, 374 (2006).
99.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2) (2011) (Medicare law only provides for reimbursement
for future medical expenses specifically associated with workers compensation claims).
100.
See Medicare Secondary-Payer and "Future Medicals," 77 Fed. Reg. 35917, 35917
(June 15, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 411).
101.

See Sara Hansard, CMS Withdraws Medicare Secondary Payer Proposed Rule,

REP.
n17179906172/.
MEDICARE

Published by LAW eCommons, 2016

(Oct.

22,

2014),

http://www.bna.com/cms-withdraws-medicare-

17

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4

52

Annals of Health Law

Vol. 25

the precarious fiscal state of public entitlement programs continue to pressure
the government to try to recoup whatever it can from tort settlements and
recoveries, potentially regardless of the amounts in settlements or awards allocated for future expenses. 102 Moreover, claimants who need significant future care will be disproportionately affected; their tort injuries will be so serious that they are likely to have lost private insurance and, therefore, be
dependent on public programs such as Medicare for their future care.103
Tortfeasors should not be able to offset against the compensation they give
claimants with the amount that claimants must pay to reimburse public programs such as Medicare.104 Such an offset is precluded by the common law
collateral source rule and by the language of statutory collateral source
rules. 105 But providing claimants with the necessary compensation would require accurately predicting what medical care those public programs will
cover in the future, how much they will pay, and how much they will seek to
be reimbursed, which is impossible. The result is that claimants are likely to
recover far less under the MOOPL proposal than they would need to enable
them both to reimburse Medicare and pay their out-of-pocket expenses for
future care. 106

102.
See Hook Law Ctr., Medicare Set-Aside Arrangements in Third Party Liability
Cases, HOOKLAWCENTER.COM (2012), http://hooklawcenter.com/pdf/pubs/personal-injuryconsulting/hlc-medicare-set-aside-arrangements-in-third-party-liability-cases.pdf (citing

"The Medicare Secondary Payor Act also applies to third party liability situations in which the
settlement or award includes payment for future medical expenses. Medicare is not bound by
the release with respect to an allocation for future medical expenses.").
103.
See Fagel, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that "in most cases involving significant future
medical costs, it is ... likely that the plaintiff would have lost their private health insurance

and gone on [Medicaid] or Medicare long before the resolution of their claim.").
104.
See McGovern & Morio, supra note 54, at 1 (The authors state that "[in states that
do not enforce the common law collateral source rule, which precludes the reduction of a personal injury award by the amount of compensation a plaintiff receives from a source other than
the tortfeasor, such awards should be reduced to the cost of obtaining necessary insurance to
pay for the [future] care, so long as the insurer does not maintain a legal right of subroga-

tion.") (emphasis in original).
105.
See Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule:
Seeking GreaterFairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 211 (2009)

(the author states, "The majority of the statutes [modifying the collateral source rule] prohibit
the recovery of damages that have been paid by a collateral source. However, these statutes
generally exclude collateral payments for which there are subrogation rights, to ensure that a

plaintiff is not undercompensated.").
106.
See Rebecca Levenson, Allocating the Costs ofHarm To Whom They Are Due: Modifying the CollateralSource Rule After Health Care Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 930 n.41

(2012) ( "In some cases, subrogation can result in reductions from noneconomic as well as
economic damages because, after the legal fees and costs of their suit, the claimant's economic
damages may not satisfy the subrogation agreement."); see Gregory Pitts, Comment, E.R.I.S.A.
Subrogation as Interpreted Within the Seventh Circuit A Roadmapfor Managing FirstDollar Recovery, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 765, 769-70 (2002); see also Hook Law Ctr., supra

note 102 at 2 ("The Medicare Secondary Payor Act also applies to third party liability situa-
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UnrealisticRole for Life Care Planners

A final point illustrating the unworkable nature of the MOOPL proposal
is the unrealistic expectation that life care planners can predict claimants'
non-insured out-of-pocket expenses for future medical care.107 Life care planners are professionals who determine the future care that injured or ill persons
require and how much those services will cost. 0 8 Their objective is "to develop accurate and timely cost information and specificity of service allocations that can be easily utilized by the client and interested parties."10 9 To do
this, they employ "sources that are reasonably available to the client."110 Life
care planners are not experts on the ACA, health insurance, or coverage for
future services."' They do not have access to adequate information about
individual plan coverage policies and practice, network breadth and depth,
billing practices, and subrogation behavior that is available, much less to the
information that would be necessary for them to produce a plausible estimate
of how much compensation claimants would actually require. Yet that is what
the authors unrealistically expect of them:
[The proposal] suggests a new task for life care planners. As noted previously, under the old health insurance laws the task of the life care planner
was to identify any medical and living expenses that are necessary for the
victim but would not otherwise have been required in the absence of the
accident.. the life care planner also needs to specifically address which
health care and living expenses would normally be covered by the minimum insurance requirements mandated by the ACA and which health expenditures.

112

tions in which the settlement or award includes payment for future medical expenses. Medicare is not bound by the release with respect to an allocation for future medical expenses.")
(The report explains that, "if there is a sizable MSA [Medicare set-Aside Arrangement], the
balance is usually funded with a structured settlement. The structured settlement is usually
payable in annual installments. The remainder of the Set-Aside is divided by the remainder of
the claimant's life expectancy and the structured pays annual deposits into the MSA based on
a 'anniversary date' which cannot be more than one year after the settlement date. If the funds
paid into the MSA from the structured settlement are exhausted before the next 'anniversary
date' Medicare pays until such time as the next structured settlement payment is received.")
Id. at 5.

107.

See Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 157.

108.

See InternationalAcademy of Life Care Planners Standards of Practice, INT'L

Assoc. OF REHAB PROF'LS (2009), http://www.rehabpro.org/sections/ialcp/focus/standards/
ialcpSOPpdf ("The Life Care Plan is a dynamic document based upon published standards
of practice, comprehensive assessment, data analysis and research, which provides an organized, concise plan for current and future needs with associated cost for individuals who have
experienced catastrophic injury or have chronic health care needs.").
109.
Id.

110.

Id.

111.

See id.

112.

Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 157.
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In short, it is impossible to predict what health care services will be mandated in the future under the ACA, let alone what services that will not be
covered under the act, whether insurers will cover those services, or what
claimants will have to pay whether or not those services are covered. Neither
life care planners nor anyone else will be able to make these predictions with
any degree of accuracy. As a consequence, there is no way to award claimants
their out-of-pocket expenses for future medical care as the MOOPL proposal
contemplates.
IV.

ADOPTING THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE BAD PUBLIC POLICY

The final reason that the MOOPL proposal should be rejected is that it is
not in the public interest. It would abolish the collateral source rule, reducing
the deterrent effect of the tort system and thereby reducing the quality of
health care.113 It would shift costs from tortfeasors to taxpayers, and impose
further significant losses on innocent persons who sustained tort injuries. Finally, the proposal would give tort system critics what they were unable to
obtain through the democratic process.
A.

By Reducing the DeterrentEffect of the Tort System, the Proposal
Would Reduce the Quality of Health Care

A noteworthy omission in the paper proposing the MOOPL limit is the
absence of any discussion of deterrence such as the impact the proposal
would have on incentives to provide proper medical care.114 The omission is
noteworthy because the authors are both economists, and economists usually
contend that the primary purpose of the tort system is to minimize the cost of
accidents by requiring tortfeasors to "internalize" their injury-creating costs
of doing business and thereby incentivizing them to reduce injuries.115 For
economists, the tort system's internal imperative to make accident victims
whole is interesting only because and to the extent that acting on the imperative creates optimal incentives for primary conduct. Otherwise, compensation
payments are merely cash transfers with few effects on aggregate wealth.
The authors of the paper stand the conventional economic approach on its
head. They focus solely on the "make whole" objective and say nothing
about the effect their proposal would have on primary actors' incentives.16
113.
See generally id. at 158-59; see also infra section IV.B. at 31 (even in states that
have legislatively modified the common law collateral source rule, defendants typically are
not entitled to an offset for insurance payments for future medical expenses).
114.
See Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 157.
115.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Wellness, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 961, 1021-27 (2001); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L.
REv. 757, 764 (1975); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1107 (1972).
116.
See generally Congdon-Hohman & Matheson, supra note 1, at 153-60.
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"

Under their proposal, a major component of the costs of injuries, namely future medical care, would shift from an internal cost for the tortfeasor to an
external cost borne by health insurance plans and taxpayers, thus incentivizing carelessness rather than reasonable behavior.
By shifting the costs of malpractice and other tortious injuries away from
tortfeasors, the proposal would effectively abolish the collateral source rule,
which precludes the introduction of evidence of collateral payment for tortious injuries in order to maximize the deterrence of negligent behavior." If
the MOOPL proposal were in place, the incentives to avoid negligent injuries
would be deficient. Healthcare costs constitute a large and growing portion
of many tort victims' damages, and the proposal would shift responsibility
for those costs above the current MOOPL from tortfeasors (and their third
party liability insurers) to victims (and their first-party healthcare insurers).
In effect, the premiums policyholders pay for first-party coverage would subsidize negligent actors by freeing them from financial responsibility for a
substantial fraction of the costs attributable to their behaviors. The predictable results are that negligent behaviors will occur more often and will have
consequences that are more severe.
Reducing the deterrent effect of the tort system is unacceptable in view of
the amount of harm caused by negligence. According to a recent estimate,
preventable harms to patients alone cause more than 400,000 premature
deaths per year, making medical errors the cause of nearly one-sixth of all
deaths in the U.S. per year.119 The total number of treatment-related injuries
exceeds the number of fatalities by far, as more than 6 million patients are
thought to be injured iatrogenically each year. 120 The social cost of adverse
medical events has been estimated to be between $393 and $958 billion per
year. 121
It may be tempting to respond to this point by observing that the proposal
resembles no-fault insurance, which also shifts financial responsibility for
losses to first-party insurers, and that the adoption of no-fault insurance did
not cause drivers to operate motor vehicles more recklessly than before. 122
The observation has limited force, however, because drivers have other reasons to be careful. Accidents destroy negligent drivers' property, endanger
117.
Id.
118.
See infra section IV.B. at 31 (even in states that have legislatively modified the
common law collateral source rule, defendants typically are not entitled to an offset for insurance payments for future medical expenses).
119.
John T. James, A New, Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with
Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122, 127 (2013).
120.
John C. Goodman et al., The Social Cost OfAdverse Medical Events, And What We
Can Do About It, 30 HEALTH AFF. 590, 591 (2011).
121.
Id. at 593.
122.
What Does No-Fault Insurance Cover?, ALLSTATE INS. CO. (January 2013),
https://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/car-insurance/no-fault-insurance-cover.aspx.
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their lives and health, cause their insurance premiums to rise,123 and may
jeopardize their licenses. 124 Medical malpractice is completely different.
Aside from tort liability, malpractice causes little inconvenience to those who
commit it. In fact, they may profit from it by being paid first for delivery of
the services that cause patients harm and then a second time for correcting
their mistakes. 125

Nor do healthcare providers risk other serious consequences by harming
patients. State medical boards are slow to investigate errors, slower to discipline providers, and slower still to censure them or restrict their licenses. 126
As a result, the likelihood that a hospital would suffer any regulatory censure
as a result of harming a patient is also remote.
In the healthcare context, then, the tort system carries the heavy burden of
creating incentives that motivate primary actors to do better than they otherwise would. The system's ability to perform this function is already impaired,
not least because many states have capped patients' damage recoveries and
restricted their ability to sue in other ways. 127 Yet recent evidence shows that
the liability system continues to exert a patient-protecting effect. 128 The
MOOPL proposal would endanger the system's continued success by further
insulating providers from the costs of medical mistakes.

123.
Kim Peterson, Car Accident? Here's How Much Your Rates Could Rise, CBS (January 27, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/heres-how-much-your-ratescould-rise-after-an-accident/.
124.
Melissa Crumish, Actions That lead to the Loss of Driving Privileges, DMV.ORG
(June 10, 2012), http://www.dmv.org/articles/actions-that-lead-to-the-loss-of-drivingprivileges/.
125.
See Manoj Jain, Medical ErrorsAre Hardfor Doctor's to Admit, But it's Wise to
Apologize to Patients, WASH. POST (May 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/medical-errors-are-hard-for-doctors-to-admit-but-its-wise-toapologize-to-patients/2013/05/24/95e21a2a-915f-1 1e2-9abd-e4c5c9dc5e90_story.html.
126.
See Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Thousands of Doctors PracticingDespite Errors, Misconduct, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2013/08/20/doctors-licenses-medical-boards/2655513/ (concluding that "[d]octors with the worst malpractice records keep treating patients: Among the nearly 100,000 doctors who made payments to resolve malpractice claims from 2001 to 2011, roughly 800 were
responsible for 10% of all the dollars paid and their total payouts averaged about $5.2 million
per doctor. Yet fewer than one in five faced any sort of licensure action by their state medical

boards.").
127.
See Zenon Zabinski & Bernard S. Black, The DeterrentEffect of Tort Law: Evidence
from Medical MalpracticeReform 6 (Nw. Univ. Inst. Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 13-xx,
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2161362.
128.
See id. at 2 (finding strong evidence that patient safety generally falls after the reforms); Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of MedicalMalpractice
Liability, 32 INT. REv. L. EcON. 356, 356 (2012) (asserting that malpractice liability leads to
modest reductions in patient mortality; the value of these more than likely exceeds the cost
impacts of malpractice liability).
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The ProposalWould Be Costly For Taxpayers

The MOOPL proposal not only would shift costs from wrongdoers to innocent claimants, but from wrongdoers to taxpayers. Since health insurers
would pay for future medical expenses, insurance premiums would rise. 129
The ACA provides government subsidies for those who cannot afford health
insurance premiums, with the subsidies tied to the cost of the second-lowestcost "silver" plan in their state.130 Therefore, as premiums for those plans
increased, the amount of taxpayer subsidies would have to be increased.131
This is especially noteworthy given the extent of the subsidies. For example,
they are available to individuals and families with incomes up to 400 percent
of the federal poverty level; in 2015, this would include a family of four with
an income of up to $97,000.132
The proposal also would conflict with the statutory rights of public programs such as Medicare to be reimbursed for their expenditures on care required to tort-related injuries.133 As noted above, claimants who require future medical care for their injuries are likely to be on Medicare and Medicaid
rather than to have private insurance.134 The less compensation that claimants
receive from tortfeasors for future medical costs, the less funds will be available to reimburse these programs. The drain on these programs would reduce
the health care resources available to those claimants, as well as elderly, poor,
and underserved individuals. As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in
Cates v. Wilson, "between defendants who tortiously inflict injury and innocent taxpayers who fund programs such as Medicaid, we think it better that
the loss fall on the tortfeasor."135
Finally, the proposal would impose greater costs on taxpayers by pushing
into poverty claimants whose future out-of-pocket expenses exceed their recoveries. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that the inability to pay medical bills is a major cause of financial hardship:

129.
See Rising Health Care Costs, AHIP, https://www.ahip.org/Issues/Rising-HealthCare-Costs.aspx (last visited November 16, 2015).
130.
See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R431137 HEALTH
INSURANCE PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

(ACA) 9 (2014).
131.
See AHIP, supra note 131.
132. 2015 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/15poverty.cfm.
See Reporting a Case, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVs., https://
133.
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Attorney-Services/
Reporting-a-Case/Reporting-a-Case.html (last updated October 1, 2015, 4:56 PM).
134.
See Fagel, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that "in most cases involving significant future
medical costs, it is ... likely that the plaintiff would have lost their private health insurance
and gone on [Medicaid] or Medicare long before the resolution of their claim").
135.
Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987).
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An estimated 1 in 3 Americans report having difficulty paying their medical bills - that is, they have had problems affording medical bills within
the past year, or they are gradually paying past bills over time, or they have
bills they can't afford to pay at all. Medical debt - and a host of related
problems - can result when people can't afford to pay their medical bills.
While the chances of falling into medical debt are greater for people who
are uninsured, most people who experience difficulty paying medical bills
have health insurance. Medical debt can arise when people must pay outof-pocket for care not covered by health insurance or to which cost-sharing
(such as deductibles) applies. Medical debt might also result from health
insurance premiums that individuals find difficult to afford. 136
The Kaiser Report notes that "the consequences of medical debt can be
severe. People with unaffordable medical bills report higher rates of other
problems - including difficulty affording housing and other basic necessities,
137
credit card debt, bankruptcy, and barriers accessing health care."
C.

The Proposal Unfairly Would Impose FurtherSignificant Losses on
Persons Who Sustained Tort-Related Injuries

In view of the intractable problems associated with efforts to calculate
claimants' out-of-pocket expenses described above, the MOOPL proposal
would produce wildly inaccurate estimates of the amounts of compensation
due claimants for the future medical expenses necessitated by their tort inju-

ries. More than likely, claimants' recoveries would be insufficient to enable
them to pay the out-of-pocket costs for the care they need, and the difference
between what they recovered and what they might end up needing to pay

could be substantial. Yet, while the tortfeasors' costs would be fixed by the
amount of compensation they paid, the innocent claimants would be left to
bear the entire risk that their recoveries would be adequate. 138

136.

Karen Pollitz et al., Medical Debt Among People With Health Insurance, KAISER

FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2014), http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/medical-debt-among-peoplewith-health-insurance.
137. Id.
138.
See Cardeli, supra note 15, at 19 (arguing that "[w]hen a judge or jury determines
what future medical expenses will be covered by a collateral source, the injured party bears all
the risk. Any uncovered future medical expenses will come out of the injured party's pocket.").
Indeed, persons who suffer malpractice injuries might receive no compensation whatsoever
because they would be unable to find an attorney to represent them. Plaintiffs' attorneys, who
are paid on a contingent fee basis, can only afford to take cases that offer the prospect of a
sufficient amount of damages to justify the costs of pursuing them. Compensation for future
medical expenses is a substantial component of the recoveries that claimants receive, "a defining damages variable." See Jason P. Ferrante, The Affordable Care Act and Healthcare
Litigation: Adjusting Our Thoughts on Future Economic Damages, 6 CLEV. METRo. BAR

Ass'N J. 12, 12 (2014). A report by the Rand Corporation, for example, estimated that medical
costs comprised approximately 25 percent of total payments for medical liability. See DAVID
I. AUERBACH ET AL., How WILL THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
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The risk of such an unjust result led the district court in an analogous case
to reject the government's argument that a service member's damages in a
medical malpractice action against the military should be reduced because
the military health program might pay medical expenses in the future.13 9 The
government maintained that the plaintiff would be entitled to these health
care benefits because her husband would remain in the military.140 The court
disagreed, observing, "there can be no assurance that the Tricare/CHAMPUS
program will continue for the balance of Mrs. Lawson's life, nor that the benefit levels will never change." 141Accordingly, stated the court, "an offset
based on speculative benefits would be an injustice because it would force
Mrs. Lawson alone to bear the entire risk that her husband will continue to
be employed by the Air Force, and that he will do so for the time required for
him to attain retirement benefits which will continue without change for the
rest of her life."" 2 Thus the Court declined to offset Mrs. Lawson's damages
award for anticipated benefits reasoning that may never be received.143
One reason why claimants are likely to be shortchanged by the MOOPL
proposal, mentioned earlier, is that public programs such as Medicare may
require reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of the claimant
that leave the claimant without sufficient funds to pay out-of-pocket expenses
for future care. In states that retain the collateral source rule, the effect of the
proposal would be to give the defendant an offset for 100 percent of the benefits that a claimant obtains from another source, exactly what the collateral
source rule forbids. It is also important to understand that even in states that
have legislatively modified the common law collateral source rule, either by

AFFECT LIABILITY INSURANCE COSTS?,

RAND

CORP.

20-21 (2014), available at http://

www.rand.org/pubs/research-reports/RR493.html. This holds true for settlements as well as
court-ordered recoveries. The Rand report describes the effect of subrogation, for example, on
the availability of legal representation: "Claim frequency is, in part, determined by the incentives that potential claimants and attorneys face in deciding whether to pursue claims, and
norms regarding subrogation can alter the total amount of compensation available to an injured
party. For example, in an environment in which subrogation generally does not occur, if Medicaid is expected to pay $500 for medical care and then a liability insurer is expected to make
a payment of $1,000 to an injured party, a potential claimant should file a claim if the costs of
doing so are less than $1,500. However, if subrogation were widespread, then Medicaid would
recover $500 of the $1,000 payment from the liability insurer, leaving only $1,000 available
in total compensation to the injured party and thus potentially reducing the incentive to file a
claim in the first place." Id. at 43; see also Geslison & Jacobs, supra note 87, at 244 (arguing
that "[i]n the vast majority of personal injury cases, the settlement amount or the damages
awarded by the verdict were tied closely to the actual damages-primarily lost wages and
medical costs-incurred as a result of the injury").
139. Lawson v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 373, 415 (D. Md. 2006).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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the terms of the legislation itself" and/or by judicial decision,145 tortfeasors,
typically, are not entitled to reduce claimants' recoveries by the amounts paid
by insurance for future medical expenses or when recoveries are subject to
governmental or contractual rights of subrogation. 14 6
Another way in which the proposal would burden claimants with future
medical expenses is by limiting their ability to obtain quality care. As noted
144.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a), (b) (West 2014) ("In any civil action ...
wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from ... personal injury or wrongful
death ... arising out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider, . . .the
court shall reduce the amount of such award ... by an amount equal to the total of amounts
determined to have been paid .... Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by
the trier of fact and before the court enters judgment, the court shall receive evidence from the
claimant and other appropriate persons concerning the total amount of collateral sources which

have been paid for the benefit of the claimant as of the date the court enters judgment."); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2010) ("In a personal injury or wrongful death action, the court
shall allow the admission into evidence of ... proof of collateral source payments . . . .");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251(1) (West 2008) ("'[C]ollateral sources' means payments related

to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiff's behalf up to the
date of the verdict . . . ."); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508(a) (West 2002) ("[A] claimant
in a medical professional liability action is precluded from recovering damages for past medical expenses or past lost earnings incurred to the time of trial to the extent that the loss is

covered by a private or public benefit or gratuity that the claimant has received prior to trial.");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (West 2006) ("Any party may present evidence to the trier
of fact that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the injury complained of from any
source . . . .").
145.
See Staats v. Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 63 A.D.3d 1573, 1574 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009) ("We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting defendant a further offset beyond that 27-month period, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. We agree with

plaintiff that defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing 'with reasonable certainty,'
i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that plaintiff would remain entitled to the continued

receipt of benefits from a collateral source."); Grell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:05-cv-1237J-32HTS, 2007 WL 1362728, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2007) ("Accordingly, the Court declines
to set off potential future third party insurance or Medicare payments for future medical expenses."); Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("[P]ayments
from a collateral source may not be set off against future medical expenses under Michigan
law. . . ."); Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159, 1162-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)

("[T]he phrase 'if a plaintiff .. . is entitled to receive benefits,' [as used in collateral source
statute,] refers only to those benefits to be paid post-judgment to which plaintiff has an established, enforceable legal right when judgment is entered and which are not subject to modification based on future unpredictable events or conditions. In other words, future collateral
benefits are deductible [under collateral source statute] only to the extent that 'they can be

determined with a reasonable degree of certainty."'); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So. 2d
289, 291-92 (Fla. 2000) (holding that future potential benefits under the medical payments

coverage were not "available" within the meaning of the statute, requiring a court to reduce
damages by amounts otherwise available from all collateral sources, and, thus, the remaining
benefits did not require a setoff).
146.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(A) (West 2015) ("In any tort action, the
defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result
of the damages that result from an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is the subject
of the claim upon which the action is based, except if the source of collateral benefits has a
mandatory self-effectuating federal right of subrogation, a contractual right of subrogation, or
a statutory right of subrogation . . . .").
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earlier, patient choice already is being reduced as health plans establish "narrow networks."14 7 If, due to the MOOPL proposal, the amount of compensation for future medical expenses were insufficient to cover the costs of outof-network care, claimants might have no choice but to try to obtain care
from providers within the network. Yet, the services they need might not be
available within the network, the network's providers might be of substandard quality, or the services might have to be obtained from the providers who
were responsible for the claimants' injuries in the first place. Similar concerns led the judge in a medical malpractice action against the Veterans Administration under the Federal Tort Claims Act to refuse to agree with the
government that the plaintiffs compensation for future medical expenses
should be reduced because of the availability of care from the VA:
The amount of such possible, prospective medical benefits, if any, is far
too speculative for the Court to place a figure upon. Moreover, were the
Court to deduct a set-off for possible, prospective medical benefits, the setoff would, as a practical matter, unduly limit and virtually pre-determine
not only the kind of medical care necessary for the treatment of the plaintiff's condition, but also the source of such medical care. This pre-determination would be somewhat burdensome because the plaintiff could not
receive nursing home care or undergo outside surgical procedures without
the approval of a Veterans' Administration physician. This pre-determination, moreover, would be especially onerous if it were to force the plaintiff
to undergo treatment at a Veterans' Administration facility whose sister
facility has caused the plaintiff to suffer the damages found in this case. 148
By shifting the costs of malpractice and other tortious injuries from tortfeasors to those whom they injure, the MOOPL proposal would not only reduce the deterrent effect of the tort system, as discussed earlier, but would
violate the other primary goals of the collateral source rule, namely, promoting corrective justice and preventing tortfeasors from receiving unjust enrichment. 149 As one prominent court classically recognized:
In general the law seeks to award compensation, and no more, for personal
injuries negligently inflicted. Yet an injured person may usually recover in
full from a wrongdoer regardless of anything he may get from a "collateral
source" unconnected with the wrongdoer. Usually the collateral contribution necessarily benefits either the injured person or the wrongdoer.

147. See Abelson, supra note 35, at Al and accompanying text.
148. Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1108 (D. Conn. 1984) (internal citation
omitted).
149. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) ("The purpose of the collateral source rule is tort deterrence. The tortfeasor is required to compensate the injured party
for the fair value of the harm caused, and is not to benefit from either contractual arrangements
of the injured party with insurers or from any gifts from others intended for the injured party.").
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Whether it is a gift or the product of a contract of employment or of insurance, the purposes of the parties to it are obviously better served and the
interests of society are likely to be better served if the injured person is
benefitted [sic] than if the wrongdoer is benefitted [sic]. Legal "compensation" for personal injuries does not actually compensate. Not many people would sell an arm for the average or even the maximum amount that
juries award for loss of an arm. Moreover the injured person seldom gets
the compensation he "recovers", for a substantial attorney's fee usually
comes out of it. There is a limit to what a negligent wrongdoer can fairly,
i.e., consistently with the balance of individual and social interests, be required to pay. But it is not necessarily reduced by the injured person's getting money or care from a collateral source. 150
The corrective justice objective of the collateral source rule was recently
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 151 Noting that

the rule has been "a staple of American tort law since before the Civil
War," 152 the court called it "a central part of the tort system's goal of requiring tortfeasors to make right their wrongful acts," 153 adding that "[t]he primary unifying principle of tort law is one of corrective justice, that is, the law
establishes a legal duty for a tortfeasor to repair any damage or losses care-

lessly inflicted upon a victim."154
D.

The Proposal Would Deprive Injured Persons of a Legal Remedy

If the MOOPL proposal were adopted, claimants would risk not only being
inadequately compensated for malpractice and other tort-related injuries, but
also receiving no compensation whatsoever because they would be unable to

find an attorney to represent them. Plaintiffs' attorneys, who are paid on a
contingent fee basis, can only afford to take cases that offer the prospect of a
sufficient amount of damages to justify the costs of pursuing them. 155 Com-

150.
Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Hudson v. Lazarus, 217
F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
151.
Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 449 (W. Va. 2014).
152.
Id. at 440.
153.
Id. at 445.
154.
Id.
155.
See AUERBACH, supra note 138, at 43 ("Claim frequency is, in part, determined by
the incentives that potential claimants and attorneys face in deciding whether to pursue claims,
and norms regarding subrogation can alter the total amount of compensation available to an
injured party. For example, in an environment in which subrogation generally does not occur,
if Medicaid is expected to pay $500 for medical care and then a liability insurer is expected to
make a payment of $1,000 to an injured party, a potential claimant should file a claim if the
costs of doing so are less than $1,500. However, if subrogation were widespread, then Medicaid would recover $500 of the $1,000 payment from the liability insurer, leaving only $1,000
available in total compensation to the injured party and thus potentially reducing the incentive
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pensation for future medical expenses is a substantial component of the recoveries that claimants receive, "a defining damages variable" in the words
of one commentator. 5 6 This holds true for settlements as well as court-or15
dered recoveries.s
A report by the Rand Corporation, for example, estimated that medical costs comprised approximately 25 percent of total payments for medical liability. 15 Fewer persons injured by negligence therefore
would obtain legal representation if the MOOPL proposal reduced their damages for future medical expenses. 159
E.

The Proposal Would Give Criticsof the Tort System What They
Were Unable to Obtain Through the DemocraticProcess

If, as is likely under the MOOPL proposal, tort claimants would be unable
to obtain sufficient compensation to enable them to obtain future medical
care, the effect would be as if the ACA imposed a cap on recoverable damages for health care expenses. When the ACA was before Congress, organizations representing medical professionals and other interest groups lobbied
hard to have provisions limiting patients' rights to sue for medical malpractice included in the statute.160 They failed.' As enacted by Congress and
signed by President Obama, the ACA left the right to sue unaltered. 162
After losing in the democratic process, critics of the tort system now seek
to use the courts to accomplish their goals. 163 They contend that, even though
Congress rejected their entreaties, courts should limit injured claimants' recoverable damages for future health care costs to the MOOPL that the act

156. Ferrante, supra note 138 at 12.
157. See Geslison & Jacobs, supra note 87, at 244 ("[I]n the vast majority of personal
injury cases, the settlement amount or the damages awarded by the verdict were tied closely
to the actual damages-primarily lost wages and medical costs-incurred as a result of the

injury.").
158.
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160. See Leonard J. Nelson, III et al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21
HEALTH MATRIX 443, 445 (2011) ("Although it was highly unlikely that health care reform
legislation would include damages caps, they were much discussed during the debate. In fact,
damages caps emerged as a primary component of Republican alternatives to the proposed

Democratic health reform bill.").
161. See id. at 444 ("[A]1ternative medical liability reforms (e.g., disclosure and offer,
health courts, safe harbors) . . . w[ere] not included in the final legislation.").
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163. See generally Tort Reform, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/legal-topics/litigation-center/case-summaries-topic/tort-reform.page?
(providing a comprehensive list of cases in which defendant argue for the limitation of recoverable damages for future health care costs).).
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sets for individuals covered by conforming health plans.164 In short, the proposal is an effort to sneak in through the side door restrictions on tort actions.
Having failed to convince Congress to curtail claimants' rights, opponents of
the liability system hope to gain a more favorable reception in federal and
state courts.165 Judges should not go along. By doing so, they would give
litigation opponents a victory the democratic process denied them.
V. CONCLUSION

The MOOPL proposal is based on a host of unwarranted and erroneous
assumptions and unrealizable expectations. From a policy standpoint, it contradicts the long-standing principle that persons sustaining medical malpractice and other tort-related injuries should be able to easily obtain all the health
care they need as a result of their injuries.166 Injured persons are already being
denied adequate compensation for their injuries.167 "[P]laintiffs on average
recovered just over half their costs," observes Stanford professor Deborah
Rhode, "and those with the most severe injuries ended up with only a
third."16' The MOOPL proposal would substantially worsen their plight.
Winners under the proposal would be providers and liability carriers who
commit and profit from patient injuries. The losers would be innocent persons
who were left to bear the entire risk of inadequate recoveries, other members
of their health plans who would bear increased insurance costs, and ultimately, the public. The proposal must be rejected.
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